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Abstract
The pari passu principle is the most prominent principle in the law of in-
solvency. We report from a lab experiment designed to study whether people
find this principle a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem. The experi-
mental design generates situations where participants work and accumulate
claims in firms, some of which subsequently go bankrupt. Third-party arbi-
trators are randomly assigned to determine how the liquidation value of the
bankrupt firms should be distributed between claimants. Our main finding
is that there is a striking support for the pari passu principle of awarding
claimants proportionally to their pre-insolvency claims. We estimate a ran-
dom utility model that allows for the arbitrators to differ in what they consider
a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem and find that about 85 percent of the
participants endorse the proportional rule. We also find that a non-negligible
fraction of the arbitrators follow the constrained equal losses rule, while there
is almost no support in our experiment for the constrained equal awards rule
or other fairness rules suggested in the normative literature. Finally, we show
that the estimated random utility model nicely captures the observed arbi-
trator behavior, in terms of both the overall distribution of awards and the
relationship between awards and claims.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy law is concerned with situations where a debtor is unable to pay its
debts and it constitutes an essential element in any well-functioning market econ-
omy (Hotchkiss, John, Moordadian, and Thorburn, 2008). Bankruptcy situations
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bring about distributive conflicts between claimants, and a fundamental issue in
bankruptcy law is how the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm should be distributed
among the claimants. There is much variation in how national bankruptcy laws
distribute assets between different classes of claimants, defined by their security
interest, but within the class of typically unsecured claimants, assets are normally
distributed in proportion to the pre-insolvency claims. This rule is known as the
pari passu principle and it is arguably “the foremost principle in the law of insol-
vency around the world” (Keay and Walton, 1999).
An important argument for a proportional distribution of assets among
claimants is that it guarantees non-manipulability (de Frutos, 1999; Ju, Miyagawa,
and Sakai, 2007), i.e., claimants do not have an incentive to merge or split their
claims. Non-manipulability is, however, not the only relevant consideration in dis-
tributive situations. Many experimental studies have demonstrated that fairness
considerations are essential for how people handle distributional conflicts (Cappe-
len, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2013; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden,
2010; Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007; Cherry, Frykblom,
and Shogren, 2002; Ga¨chter and Riedl, 2005; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki,
2004; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; Jakiela, forthcoming; Konow,
2000, 1996; Rodriguez-Lara, 2015; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008), and it is therefore
of great importance to understand whether the prominent pari passu approach to
the bankruptcy problem also is considered a fair way of distributing the liquidation
value among claimants.
Following the seminal contributions of O’Neill (1982) and Aumann and
Maschler (1985), there is an extensive literature using axiomatic analysis to study
the normative appeal of different fairness rules, including the proportional rule, in
conflicting claims problems in general and in bankruptcy situations in particular.
Two prominent alternatives considered in this literature are the constrained equal
awards rule, which divides available funds equally among claimants constrained
by the requirement that no claimant receives more than his or her claim, and the
constrained equal losses rule, which distributes losses equally among claimants
constrained by the requirement that no claimant loses more than his or her claim.
A common feature of these alternatives to the proportional rule is that they aim
to capture an egalitarian intuition, but in different ways.1 The constrained equal
awards rule can be seen as applying the egalitarian intuition when dividing “what is
still available”, while the constrained equal losses rule is egalitarian when dividing
“what is missing”. The main contribution of the present paper is to study whether
these alternative egalitarian solutions to the bankruptcy problem are regarded more
attractive on fairness grounds than the proportional rule.2
1Among the many other rules proposed in the axiomatic literature, the most famous one is ar-
guably the Talmud rule, a hybrid of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal
losses rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2006). In our experiment, we
do not find any evidence of participants following the Talmud rule and thus we do not focus on it in
the following discussion.
2There are also theoretical noncooperative studies of the bankruptcy problem, which look at how
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Previous empirical work provides mixed evidence on the normative appeal of
these different fairness rules in claims problems. Empirical studies using a ques-
tionnaire approach suggest that the proportional rule is considered most attrac-
tive (Ga¨chter and Riedl, 2006; Bosmans and Schokkaert, 2009; Herrero, Moreno-
Ternero, and Ponti, 2010), while the evidence from laboratory experiments is more
mixed. Ga¨chter and Riedl (2005) find that actual bargaining agreements are closest
to the constrained equal awards solution, while Herrero et al. (2010) find support
for the proportional rule in negotiations where unanimous coordination on the same
rule is required to solve the claims problem.
The present paper differs from earlier contributions in two important respects.
First, our paper studies behavior in real bankruptcy situations in a lab experimental
setting and does not rely on framing to create hypothetical bankruptcy situations.
In particular, the experiment generates bankruptcy situations where participants
work and earn money in firms, some of which subsequently go bankrupt and do
not have sufficient funds to pay the sum of claims of the workers. Second, our
paper is the first to study how people behave when they are assigned the role of
a third-party arbitrator and have to decide how to distribute the liquidation value
among the claimants in a bankrupt firm. The arbitrators are not restricted by any
legal rules and can therefore freely distribute assets. Our design also removes
any manipulability concerns and other incentive problems and therefore provides a
clean identification of what the arbitrators consider a fair division of the liquidation
value among claimants.
Our main finding is that there is a striking support for the pari passu approach.
A large majority of arbitrators are motivated by the proportional solution when
awarding claimants in bankruptcy situations. We estimate a random utility model
that allows for the arbitrators to differ in what they consider a fair solution to the
bankruptcy problem and find that 85.4 percent of the participants endorse the pro-
portional rule. This clearly demonstrates that the proportional or pari passu rule is
not only attractive because it guarantees non-manipulability, it is also considered
by most individuals as the fair way of distributing the liquidation value. We find
that a non-negligible fraction of the arbitrators follow the constrained equal losses
rule, while there is almost no support for the constrained equal awards rule in our
experiment. Finally, we show that the estimated random utility model captures the
observed arbitrator behavior, in terms of both the overall distribution of awards and
the relationship between awards and claims.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a further discussion of the
different fairness rules that can be used in a bankruptcy situation. Section 3 presents
the sample and the experimental design. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on
the production phase and the arbitrator decisions, while we introduce and estimate
the different rules affect investments and social welfare when claims are endogenous. Kibris and
Kibris (2013) find that with risk-averse agents, the proportional rule in most cases induces higher
utilitarian welfare than the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule, while
the highest investments are induced by the constrained equal losses rule. If the agents are risk neutral,
however, there is strong non-cooperative support for the proportional rule (Karago¨zoglu, 2014).
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a random utility model for the arbitrator behavior in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fair solutions to the bankruptcy problem
The bankruptcy problem occurs in a situation where there is more than one
claimant and the liquidation value to be divided among the claimants is less than
the sum of the claims. A general solution to the bankruptcy problem would be
a rule that for any specific bankruptcy situation specifies the award to be given
to each claimant. It is typically assumed that a normatively attractive rule should
fulfill the following three minimal requirements (Thomson, 2003):
• No waste of resources: The sum of awards to the claimants should be equal
to the liquidation value.
• Claims boundedness: No claimant should receive an award smaller than
zero or larger than his or her claim.
• Weak order preservation: If the claim of one claimant is at least as large as
that of another claimant, then the award given to the claimant with the larger
claim should be at least as large as the award given to the claimant with the
smaller claim.
Many rules satisfy these basic conditions, but in the present analysis we fo-
cus on the three most prominent rules in the literature; the pari passu or pro-
portional rule (P), the constrained equal awards rule (CEA), and the constrained
equal losses rule (CEL). The proportional rule states that all claimants should be
treated on an equal footing (hence pari passu) in the sense that they should obtain
awards pro rata according to their pre-insolvency claims. The key intuition under-
lying the proportional rule is an idea of “neutrality” with respect to the size of the
claim; neither large nor small claimants should be favored in the distribution of the
liquidation value. The proportional rule clearly satisfies the three basic conditions.
There are two prominent egalitarian approaches that provide interesting alter-
native solutions to the bankruptcy problem and also satisfy the three minimal con-
ditions: the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule.3
The constrained equal awards rule is the most immediate adoption of the egalitarian
idea with regard to the bankruptcy problem. It divides total assets equally between
3Outcome egalitarianism has been the focus of many important studies in behavioral economics
(Bellemare, Kro¨ger, and van Soest, 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, and Sutter, 2013; Fehr, Naef, and Schmidt,
2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), but appears extremely unattractive in a bankruptcy situation. In par-
ticular, dividing the liquidation value equally among claimants would violate Claims boundedness,
since some claimants might receive more than their pre-solvency claim. In fact, this would happen
in any bankruptcy situations where the claimants differ in their claims.
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claimants, constrained by the requirement that no claimant may receive more than
his or her claim. The constrained equal awards rule can be seen as dividing “what
is still available”, and an appealing feature of the rule is that it to some extent pro-
tects small claimants; the small claimants are always assured to receive a share of
the liquidation value.
Another way of approaching the bankruptcy problem, however, is to consider
it as a problem of dividing “what is missing”. The constrained equal losses rule
captures this intuition and equalizes losses relative to the claim, under the con-
straint that no claimant should lose more than his or her claim. The constrained
equal losses rule can be seen to protect large claimants to some extent; the large
claimants will never lose a larger share of their claim than will the small claimants.
Since our experimental design studies bankruptcy situations with two
claimants, i and j, we provide formal definitions of the three rules in the two-
claimant case.4 We denote the liquidation value as E and the claims as c= (ci,c j),
where, without loss of generality, we assume that ci ≤ c j. Further, let Fki and Fkj
denote what the rule k states as the fair award to the claimants i and j, respectively.
By the No waste of resources condition, it follows that Fkj = E−Fki .
The three fairness rules can now be stated in terms of how much is awarded to
the claimant with the lowest claim:
FPi (c,E) =
ci
ci+ c j
E, (1)
FCEAi (c,E) =
{
E
2 when 0≤ E ≤ 2ci,
ci when 2ci ≤ E ≤ ci+ c j,
FCELi (c,E) =
{
0 when 0≤ E ≤ c j− ci,
E+ci−c j
2 when c j− ci ≤ E ≤ ci+ c j.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the three fairness rules by means
of their path of awards for a fixed claims vector, but for different amounts of the
liquidation value E. Each point on the path of awards illustrates how the rule would
distribute the available amount between the two claimants.
[Figure 1 about here.]
From Figure 1 we observe that the liquidation value E plays a very different
role under the CEA-rule and the CEL-rule than under the P-rule. In particular,
the liquidation share given to the claimant with the smallest claim under the P-
rule depends only on the pre-solvency claims, while it critically depends on the
4For a more general analysis, we refer to Thomson (2003). The fact that we focus on the two-
claimant case also rules out any manipulability concerns.
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liquidation value under the CEA-rule and the CEL-rule. When the liquidation value
is very small (2c1≥E), the CEA-rule divides the liquidation value equally between
the two claimants, while the claimant with the lowest claim receives slightly more
than a proportional share when the liquidation value is very large. In contrast,
under the CEL-rule, the claimant with the lowest claim receives nothing when the
liquidation value is very small (c2− c1 ≥ E), while he or she receives slightly less
than a proportional share when the liquidation value is very large.
3 Sample and experimental design
We first provide an overview of the sample and the general structure of the ex-
periment, before we turn to a more detailed discussion of each of the three main
stages.5
3.1 Sample and setting
The participants were students at NHH Norwegian School of Economics. A total
of 109 subjects participated, 78 males and 31 females. We organized four sessions
that all took place on the same day. Each session lasted about 90 minutes and
was conducted in a computer lab using a web-based interface. The experiment
was double-blind, i.e., neither subjects nor experimenters could associate decisions
with particular participants.
3.2 Experimental design: General structure
The experimental set-up captures the bankruptcy problem and has three phases.
In the production phase, the participants acquired claims in five different firms; in
the bankruptcy phase, a random procedure determined which firms went bankrupt
as well as the liquidation value of each bankrupt firm; in the liquidation phase,
third-party arbitrators determined how the liquidation value of the bankrupt firms
was to be distributed between the claimants. At the end of the experiment, the
participants answered a short background survey after which we implemented the
payment procedure. The sequence of events in the experiment is summarized in
Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
For each bankrupt firm, the participants were paid the award assigned to them
by a third-party arbitrator; for the other firms, the participants were paid the claims
in full. Including a show up fee of 100 Norwegian Kroner (NOK), participants
earned, on average, 431 NOK (about 73 USD).6 The computer assigned a payment
5Complete instructions and screenshots are provided in Appendix B.
6If more than one third-party arbitrator had made a decision in the relevant bankruptcy situation
for a participant, we randomly selected and implemented one of the arbitrator decisions.
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code to each participant, and an assistant, who was not present in the lab during the
experiment, then prepared envelopes containing the payments for each payment
code. After bringing the envelopes to the lab, the assistant immediately left and the
envelopes were handed out in accordance with the payment codes.
3.3 Production phase
The production phase consisted of 31 production rounds. Before each production
round the participants had 30 seconds to decide in which firm they wanted to work
in that round. They could choose between five different firms, A-E, but could only
work in one firm in a production round, each lasting for 90 seconds.7
The different firms had different production technologies, which were intro-
duced to the participants before the first round. In firm A, the task was to count the
number of black squares in a sequence of boards; in firm B to add numbers; in firm
C to find a specific number in a large table of numbers; in firm D to reproduce a
given text; and in firm E to identify the scrambled version of a given word from a
list of scrambled words. The participants were informed initially that the earnings
potential was the same in all firms; participants would earn a claim of 15 NOK in
a firm in a production round if they reached the target level of production. On the
screen, the participant could see the time left of the production round, the amount
produced so far, and the target level of production.
At the end of the production phase, each participant had accumulated claims in
each firm ranging from 0 NOK (if the participant did not work or did not satisfy
the production requirement in this firm in any of the rounds) to a maximum of 465
NOK (if the participant worked in the same firm in all rounds and satisfied the
production requirement in each round).
3.4 Bankruptcy phase
In the bankruptcy phase, the computer randomly selected for each participant three
firms that went bankrupt as well as the liquidation value of each of the three firms
(35, 50, and 65 percent of the total claims in the bankrupt firm, respectively). We
then constructed the distributive situations by randomly matching participants in
pairs. To illustrate, if firm A went bankrupt with a liquidation value of 50 percent
for participant 1, then he or she would be randomly matched with another partic-
ipant 2 for whom firm A also had gone bankrupt with a liquidation value of 50
percent. The matched pair of participants 1 and 2 being claimants in the bankrupt
firm A with a liquidation value of 50 percent would then represent a bankruptcy
situation for which a third-party arbitrator would have to make a decision. In total,
the matching created 299 bankruptcy situations.
7If a participant did not make a decision within 30 seconds, the computer randomly and with
equal probability selected a firm, but this only happened in one percent of the situations.
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3.5 Liquidation phase
In the liquidation phase, each participant made decisions as a third-party arbitra-
tor in four bankruptcy situations.8 For each of the four bankruptcy decisions, the
arbitrator was informed about the claims of each of the two claimants in the firm
and the firm’s liquidation value. The arbitrator then had to decide how to divide
the liquidation value between the two claimants, where, by design, the arbitrator
had to fulfill the No waste of resources condition. At the end of this phase, the ar-
bitrators received an overview of the four decisions they had made and were given
the opportunity to revise them before making a final confirmation of their arbitrator
decisions.
This was a one-shot experiment and incentive considerations could therefore
not influence the decisions of the arbitrators. Further, since the arbitrators were
not stakeholders in the bankruptcy situations, we can also rule out that self-interest
played a role. The design therefore provides a clean identification of what the
participants considered a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem.
We introduced different liquidation values to be able to identify which fairness
rule guided the arbitrator’s decisions. In the planning of the experiment, we sim-
ulated the correlation between the different fairness rules given assumptions about
the expected variation in claims in the different firms. Based on these simulations,
we decided that the chosen liquidation values would provide sufficient variation in
the data without creating bankruptcy situations where the liquidation value would
be very small or close to the total claims in the firm. In Figure 2, we show that
our design does indeed create bankruptcy situations in the experiment where the
three fairness rules have very different implications. In the left panel, we provide
a comparison of the CEA-rule and the CEL-rule, where we observe that there are
many bankruptcy situations in which one of the rules assigns (almost) nothing to
the claimant with the smallest claim and the other rule assigns a significant amount
to this claimant. In the two other panels, we observe that the P-rule differs signifi-
cantly from the CEL-rule and the CEA-rule in how much it assigns to the claimant
with the smallest claim in the bankruptcy situations in the experiment. In line with
Figure 1, we observe in all three panels that the fairness rules only assign the same
amount to the two claimants (which are plots on the 45 degree line) when they have
the same claim in the firm.
8The procedure of assigning bankruptcy situations to arbitrators ensured that (i) the arbitrator
was not a claimant in any of the bankruptcy situations for which he or she made a decision, (ii) each
arbitrator faced all three possible liquidation shares, and (iii) all bankruptcy situations were covered
by at least one arbitrator decision. We aimed for each participant to make four arbitrator decisions
(in order to have sufficient data for the analysis), but the assignment procedure could only ensure
this if the number of participants in a session was divisible by both three and four. One participant
therefore made three arbitrator decisions and two participants made two arbitrator decisions, the rest
made four arbitrator decisions. Further, in five bankruptcy situations, the two matched claimants had
no claims in the firm and the decision of the arbitrator was therefore trivial. In total, we therefore
have 426 real arbitrator decisions in the data set. The participants made their arbitrator decisions
before knowing anything about which of their own firms had gone bankrupt or about the arbitrator
decisions made by others in the situations involving them as claimants.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
4 Descriptive statistics
We here provide descriptive statistics for the production phase and the liquidation
phase.
4.1 Production phase
Figure 3 provides an overview of the accumulation of claims across firms.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Most participants produced close to or the maximum of 31 points and the av-
erage accumulated claim was largest in Firm A (8.4) and smallest in Firm C (4.8).
Very few participants chose to specialize and only work in one firm (2.8 percent).
A larger share chose to spread the production evenly (to the extent possible) across
all the firms (21.1 percent), which may have been motivated by a desire to avoid
risk.9
Overall, we observe that there was a significant spread in the accumulated
claims in all firms, which enabled us to create bankruptcy situations for which
the three fairness rules differed significantly (see also Figure 2). The claimant with
the smallest claim in a bankruptcy situation had on average 29.6 percent of the total
claims.
4.2 Distributive choices
Figure 4 presents an overview of the arbitrator decisions. The upper part of the
figure provides histograms of the liquidation share awarded to the claimant with
the smallest claim, for all arbitrator decisions and by liquidation value. Corre-
spondingly, the lower part provides scatter plots of the relationship between the
liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the smallest claim and his or her
share of the total claims in the firm.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The claimant with the smallest claim was awarded on average 33.1 percent of
the liquidation value, but we observe from the upper part of Figure 4 that there is
huge variation in how much the claimant with the lowest claim received: nothing
in 16.0 percent of the situations, an equal share in 21.6 percent of the situations,
9The extent to which a participant concentrated the production can be measured by the Herfindahl
index, using the share of the participant’s production in each firm. In Figure A1 in Appendix A, we
show the distribution of the Herfindahl index for the participants in the experiment.
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and everything in 3.5 percent of the situations.10 There are some differences in the
distributions of the allocations across liquidation values, but these differences are
not statistically significant (p= 0.45).11
We observe from the bottom part of Figure 4 that there is a strong positive
relationship between the liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the lowest
claim and his or her share of the total claims in the firm. Many of the observations
are close to the proportional solution, but we also observe a number of observations
that deviate significantly and the linear fit is statistically significantly less than one
(p< 0.001). 12 The linear fit differs across liquidation values, but these differences
are not statistically significant (Wald-test, p= 0.73).13
Finally, we can look at the extent to which the arbitrators’ decisions satisfy
the basic conditions. By design, they had to satisfy the No waste of resources
condition, but we do observe violations of the Claims boundedness condition and
the Weak order preservation condition. Overall, one or both of these conditions
were violated in 14.8 percent of the arbitrator decisions. Claimants received strictly
more than their claim in 11.3 percent of the arbitrator decisions, and the claimant
with the smallest claim received strictly more than the claimant with the largest
claim in 9.4 percent of the arbitrator decisions.
5 Analysis
In order to study further the arbitrator decisions, we estimate a random utility
model. The model assumes that arbitrators dislike to deviate from what they view
as a fair distribution of the liquidation value, but allows for arbitrators to differ in
what they consider fair (Cappelen et al., 2013).
Formally, each arbitrator makes decisions in a number of bankruptcy situa-
tions, indexed by s, and in each situation the arbitrator has to decide how to divide
the liquidation value Es between the two claimants. Let ys denote the amount
awarded to the claimant with the smallest claim in situation s; by design, the
10The fact that some arbitrators gave everything to the claimant with the lowest claim suggests
that there is some noise in the data. In the background survey, some of the arbitrators motivated this
behavior by expressing sympathy for the claimant with the lowest claim.
11We test the equality of the distributions by using a K-way generalization of the Epps and Single-
ton (1986) test.
12In Table A1 in Appendix A, we report the detailed regressions, both with and without back-
ground variables. We observe that the only background variable that is statistically significant is fa-
miliarity with bankruptcy law, where participants who are more familiar with bankruptcy law award
a lower liquidation share to the claimant with the smallest claim; 3.7 percent of the participants
reported that they were very familiar with bankruptcy law, 54.1 percent that they were somewhat
familiar, and 42.2 percent that they were not at all familiar with bankruptcy law.
13In Figure A2 in Appendix A, we show the relationship between the liquidation share awarded
to the claimant with the weakly smallest claim and the share of the total claims for the claimant with
the smallest claim for the three fairness rules at the data points of the experiment. It illustrates that
this relationship is somewhat sensitive to liquidation value for the CEA-rule and the CEL-rule, but,
trivially, not for the P-rule.
10
other claimant receives Es − ys. The choice set for the arbitrator is given by
ys ∈ Y s = {0,5,10, . . . ,Es}. We assume that an arbitrator, indexed by i, is mo-
tivated by a fairness rule k(i) ∈ {P,CEL,CEA} when deciding how to distribute
the liquidation value, where we denote mk(i) as what is stated by fairness rule k(i)
as a fair award to the claimant with the smallest claim. More specifically, we intro-
duce the utility loss function:
V (y;k(i); ·) =−1
2
(
y−mk(i))2
Es
.
Clearly, the utility loss is minimized by the arbitrator implementing what he
or she considers the fair division of the liquidation value, i.e. y = mk(i). However,
we allow for noise in the arbitrator choices, which accommodates the fact that
the Claim boundedness and Weak order preservation conditions were some-
times violated. We introduce a random utility element which is specific to each
bankruptcy situation and to each of the alternatives in the choice set. Taken to-
gether, we therefore assume that the arbitrators are maximizing the following ran-
dom utility model,
Ui(y; ·) =V (y;k(i); ·)+ εsy/γi, for y ∈ Ys, (2)
where the random element εsy is extreme value iid and γi captures the importance
of the random element for individual i.
The random utility model provides a conditional logit model of the arbitrator
choice in each bankruptcy situation. For estimation, we assume that logγ is dis-
tributed N(µ,σ2), which means that we can write the likelihood function for an
individual as
Li =∑
k
λk
∫ ∞
0
∏
s
[
eγV (ys;·)
∑y j∈Ys e
γV (y j;·)
]
1
γσ
√
2pi
e−
1
2(
logγ−µ
σ )
2
dγ, (3)
where the λk parameters are the population shares of the different fairness types
among the participants in the experiment.
5.1 Estimates of the model
Column A in Table 2 reports estimates of the random utility model. It provides
three main insights. First, we observe that the P-rule is by far the most prevalent
fairness type in the experiment, in fact 85.4 percent of the arbitrators appear to be
motivated by proportionality considerations. Second, we find that a non-negligible
fraction of the arbitrators, 11.5 percent, view it as fair to equalize losses among
claimants, in line with the CEL-rule. Third, we observe that the share of partici-
pants who follow the CEA-rule is negligible.14 The last two findings suggest that
14The population estimates are very much in line with the motivations provided by the participants
in the background survey. The large majority state that they applied proportionality considerations
in their arbitrator choices, while a small minority make references to egalitarian considerations.
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participants motivated by an egalitarian ideal tend to view the bankruptcy problem
as a question of how to divide what is missing rather than a question of how to di-
vide what is available, which means that they are more concerned with protecting
the large claimant than the small claimant.
[Table 2 about here.]
In columns B-D in Table 2, we report estimates for the random utility model
when we drop one of the fairness types. We observe from column B that the log-
likelihood value falls dramatically if we drop the P-rule. The estimated values of
both µ and log(σ) are reduced, which means that the random utility term becomes
more important in explaining behavior. From columns C and D, we observe that
the log-likelihood value and the estimated values of µ and log(σ) only change
marginally when we remove the CEA-rule or the CEL-rule, which means that these
rules are of much less importance in explaining the observed behavior.
5.2 Fit of the random utility model
We provide two tests to evaluate the fit of the estimated random utility model.
First, in Figure 5, we show the actual and the simulated empirical distributions
function of the share given to the claimant with the smallest claim, for all arbitrator
decisions and by liquidation value. We notice that although the two distributions
differ slightly at the ends, there is overall a close fit in all panels.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Second, we test whether the estimated random utility model can predict the
relationship between the liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the lowest
claim and his or her share of the total claims in the firm. Table 3 compares re-
gressions on the actual data and on the simulated data. We observe that the model
replicates this relationship nicely, in all comparisons the estimated coefficient of
the share of the total claims in the actual data is relatively close to the estimated
coefficient in the actual data.
[Table 3 about here.]
Overall, the estimated random utility therefore seems to closely capture the
underlying motivation of the arbitrators.
6 Conclusion
Our experiment provides strong support for the use of the pari passu rule in
bankruptcy law. We find that a large majority of the participants in our experi-
ment follow the proportional rule when they act as third-party arbitrators in real
bankruptcy situations where people have different pre-insolvency claims. The
12
present experimental design rules out that manipulability concerns or other incen-
tive concerns should influence the arbitrator decisions, and thus the experimental
results provide clean evidence of the participants considering the pari passu princi-
ple a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem.
The support for this approach is not entirely universal, however. A non-
negligible share of the participants perceive it as fair to equalize the losses of the
claimants, constrained by the requirement that no one should lose more than his or
her claim. We do not, however, find much evidence of participants being motivated
by the idea that one should equalize what is available, constrained by the require-
ment that no one should receive more than their claim, or any of the other fairness
rules considered in the normative literature.
Many distributional conflicts have a similar structure as the bankruptcy prob-
lem (Gaertner and Schwettmann, 2015). To illustrate, consider employer-employee
negotiations about the profile of a wage cut across employees when a firm needs
to reduce wage costs. The perceived fairness of the wage cut may critically affect
how the workers respond in terms of effort provision, and it is therefore of great
importance to understand whether the proportionality approach is considered an
equally attractive solution to this and other conflicting claims problems as we find
is the case in bankruptcy situations.
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(c)Constrained Equal Losses
Figure 1: Paths of awards
Note: The figure illustrates the paths of awards for each of the three fairness rules.
For a pair of claims, c1 and c2, the panels (a), (b) and (c) give the distribution of
the liquidation value E for all values of E between 0 and C = c1 + c2, for each of
the three fairness rules respectively.
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Figure 2: Pairwise scatter plots of the fairness rules
Note: The figure provides pairwise comparisons of what the fairness rules imply
in each of the bankruptcy situations in the experiment. A point in the left panel
shows for one bankruptcy situation in the experiment the liquidation share awarded
to the claimant with the smallest claim according to CEA and CEL, respectively.
Correspondingly, the two other panels provide the comparison of CEA and P and
CEL and P.
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Figure 3: Production in each of the firms
Note: The figure shows the distribution of production in all firms. In each panel,
we show the share of participants who had reached the production threshold a given
number of times in this firm (0-31). The distribution of total production is given in
the lower right panel.
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Figure 4: The liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the smallest
claim
Note: The upper part of the figure shows the distribution of “Share of awards” (the
liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the weakly smallest claim), for all
situations and by liquidation value. The lower part of the figure shows scatter plots
of “Share of awards” (the liquidation share awarded to the claimant with the weakly
smallest claim) and ‘Share of claims” (the share of the total claims for the claimant
with the weakly smallest claim), for all situations and by liquidation value. We
also report the linear fit in each of the panels, the full regressions are reported in
Table A1.
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Figure 5: Empirical distribution function: Actual and simulated
Note: The figure compares the actual (in black) and simulated (in grey) empirical
distribution functions for the “Share of awards” (the liquidation share awarded to
the claimant with the weakly smallest claim), for all situations and by liquidation
value. The simulated data are based on 10000 random draws for each situation in
the dataset, using (2) and the estimates in column A of Table 2.
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Table 1: Sequence of events in the experiment
1. Production phase: Participants acquire claims in the different firms
2. Bankruptcy phase: Random draws determine which firms go bankrupt
and their liquidation value
3. Liquidation phase: Arbitrators distribute the liquidation value between
claimants
4. Background survey: Gender, years of study, familiarity with bankruptcy
law, and motivation for arbitrator decisions
5. Payment: Participants are paid their awards from the bankrupt
firms and the claims in full from the other firms
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Table 2: Estimates of the random utility model
A B C D
λP, share proportional 0.854 0.970 0.887
(0.056) (0.026) (0.049)
λCEL, share constrained equal losses 0.115 0.780 0.113
(0.049) (0.067) (0.049)
λCEA, share constrained equal awards 0.031 0.220 0.030
(0.026) (0.067) (0.026)
µ , mean of log(γ) 0.646 -0.763 0.422 0.628
(0.339) (0.178) (0.285) (0.327)
σ , standard deviation of log(γ) 2.964 1.486 3.052 2.938
(0.343) (0.171) (0.314) (0.342)
logL -745.9 -932.3 -751.6 -748.7
Note: The table reports the estimates of the random utility model (2), where λP,
λCEL, and λCEA are the share of participants with the proportional, constrained
equal losses, and constrained equal awards fairness view. Column A reports esti-
mates from the full model, whereas we in turn drop one of the fairness ideals in
column B-D. One population share and its standard error are calculated residually.
For estimation, we use the “stats4” library (R Core Team, 2015). Standard errors
(in parentheses) are calculated using the delta method where it is appropriate.
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